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It is the purpose of this brief paper to demonstrate that natur-
al law is neither natural nor law, nor useful as an ethicopolitical
concept. This will be done against the background of the theories of
Hans Kelsen, my great teacher to whom the world owes so much in
clarity of legal thinking.
I. NOT "NATuRAL"
Natural law by its very nature claims universality. It is, to quote
Father Murray, a recent authority on the subject, immanent in the
nature of man.1 It is the law, somehow, that every man ought to fol-
low or would follow if he would let himself be guided by his inborn
reason.
Yet in actual fact there exists no such norm. As every anthropol-
ogist knows and as some lawyers know - I am particularly thinking
of Max Radin's great last paper 2 - there is very little law that is un-
iversally recognized. Take for instance the Decalogue, which is often
mentioned in support of the proposition of the existence of a basic,
universal law. Yet even a superficial inspection reveals it to be a
mere outline of a code of law strongly tied to the civilization of the
time and the place in which it was promulgated. It commands de-
votion to father and mother, but it says nothing of the - to us at
least equally "natural" - duty of the parents toward their children.
It forbids adultery, but not polygamy. It proclaims monotheism
which can hardly be said to have ever been universally accepted. And
what is more important for our discussion, those of its commands
which by their wording appear to be universal norms are mere pro-
grammatical pronouncements rather than norms at all. "Thou shalt
not kill" cannot be and never was taken literally. What the Fifth
Commandment, analyzed against the totality of its context, amounts
to is a mere "Thou shalt not unlawfully kill." For killing was by no
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means unlawful per se in the Hebrew or any other civilization. The
soldier must kill the enemy. The criminal suffered death penalty
whenever the hard law so provided, as in the case of adultery, perjury
or theft. Self-defense was and is recognized as an excuse. Now, to say
that it is a universally accepted, hence natural law that no man shall
kill another man except where the legal order so commands, justifies,
or excuses him is of course nothing but another way of saying that
the question of whether a killer is guilty of a crime depends on the
positive law and therefore not on natural law.
Phrases like "To each his own" - the suum cuique of the Ro-
mans - or the postulate that justice be done and injustice be avoid-
ed are even more devoid of any universality. Every time, every na-
tion, every class, and nearly every man within nation and class, has
a different concept of what is just or unjust in a given case or of what
should be distributed to whom and upon what grounds. No two
writers on the subject of social or individual justice have ever agreed
- how can we then expect to solve controversial legal problems by a
reference to principles that defy being classified as universal or natural?
In other words, as my fellow-speaker, Professor Chroust once aptly
phrased it, the natural law idea is both "a-historic supreme" and
"characterized by the rather naive belief based upon a thoroughly ra-
tionalized and systematized interpretation of human history."3
Cahn asserts, perhaps rightly, that there is a sense of injustice
(and hence also of justice) in every man. However, he rather misun-
derstands Kelsen whom he quotes as calling the concept of justice
"irrational" and therefore "not subject to cognition." 4 Even a per-
functory reading, however, of Kelsen's works5 makes it clear that
what Kelsen calls irrational is not the - perhaps innate - sense of
injustice in every human being, but the actual object, the contents
as it were, of this sense. Granted that every person has some sense of
injustice, there can be no natural law, that is, a universal system of
norms, unless their sense of injustice would be in mutual agreement
on some points. This, unfortunately, is not the case. And I may add
that Cahn's illustration to his argument that even a baby resists acts
of aggression, such as the taking away of a thing from him, is any-
thing but convincing as far as justice is concerned. It merely shows that
man likes to keep what he has, not what "rightly" belongs to him.
Neo-naturalists can at times be heard asserting that while there
3 Chroust, On the Nature of Natural Law in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 70, 77, 79 (Sayre ed. 1947).
4 CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 11 (1949).
5 Notably: GENERL& THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945); Law, State and Justice
in the Pure Theory of Law, 57 YALE L.J. 377 (1948); The Natural-Law Doctrine
Before the Tribunal of Science, 2 WESTERN POL. REV. 481 (1949); Science and
Politics 45 A. Pot.. Sci. RFv. 641 (1951); and many other writings.
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exists no universal natural law, still there is one for each civilization.
Every epoch within a given culture, according to their argument, in
the main represented by Stammler, Gdny, and del Vecchio, has a law
that is "natural" for that particular time and place. Has it? Or is this
theory merely a somewhat complex phraseology for the postulate that
there ought to be law of such and such a kind in such and such a
civilization rather than that there is one?6 If we assume that there is a
natural law for, say, modern Western civilization - is it to be socialis-
tic or individualistic or perchance bolshevistic? Between Hayek, Ren-
ner, and Lenin each system has its protagonists and to say that one or
the other is "invalid" (rather than merely undesirable) destroys of
course the even limited concept of this natural law idea, because its
validity must depend on some authority that is to decide which sys-
tem of norms is to be the "right," i. e., valid one, in other words, on a
positive lawmaker rather than on natural and self-evident law.
II. NOT "LAW"
It is indeed the absence of a natural lawmaker that precludes
natural law from being law. Law must emanate from some source.
There must be a lawgiver, be he the tyrant or a parliament, the king
and his ministers, or the people themselves. Or the source of law may
be the deity. If we believe the proem to the Codex Hammurabi, then
the sun-god Shamash from whom Hammurabi derived his set of laws
is the supreme source of law. But the same is equally true (or
false) of the Mosaic law, of the Gospel, or the Koran. They all claim
divine origin. Perhaps one of them is. In the absence, however, of a
supreme tribunal of conflicts between different systems of religion we
cannot scientifically assert that one of them is the right one to the
exclusion of the others. So far, the validity of any one of them de-
pends on an act of faith.
Nor can we ascribe scientific accuracy to the typical eighteenth
century claim that natural law is based on reason - that it is self- evi-
dent. As long as my reason differs from yours, "reason" as such can-
not be the a priori source of any legal system, natural or otherwise.
Reason will continue to guide, we hope at least, the positive lawmak-
er's acts. But it will not dispense with the lawmaker.
Natural law by its alleged very nature cannot be law for an ad-
ditional, perhaps even more categorical reason whose discovery we
owe in the main to Hans Kelsen more than to anybody else. Natural
law, being in the clouds, so to speak, stands at the top of the legal
hierarchy. But, unlike a positive legal constitution, it has no organs
6 "The yearning for a legal ideal." RF.DIANN, LEGAL THEORY 63 (1949).
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to apply it on the lower levels of the hierarchy. Let us assume that
a given system of law, such as the Decalogue or our Constitution, be
by some miracle at last recognized as universally binding - as "na-
tural" in that sense of the phrase. Now, even if our interstate com-
merce clause and the Bill of Rights guaranteeing the right of prop-
erty are considered natural law, they must obviously be applied
("enforced") to be "law." When is a transaction "commerce"? What
is and what is not "interstate"? Is every right, such as the right to
contract away one's "freedom" to work sixty hours a week, "proper-
ty"? These and a thousand other questions present themselves. It
needs some governmental agency to answer them, e. g., the Congress or
the courts. Congress then enacts laws in execution of the supreme -
as we assume, "natural" - law declaring that certain labor relations
may fall under the regulation of interstate commerce while others do
not. Is this still natural law? Obviously not. And if it were - are the
decisions of the National Labor Relations Board that further apply
the constitutional clause by applying the statute enacted under it na-
tural law? Or the court decisions enforcing the Board decisions and
again adding something to the law? To use another example, even
if natural law may be assumed as saying that every man shall pay
his just debts, inasmuch as it fails to execute this norm, its applica-
tion must be left to human beings other than the natural lawmak-
er. The general, so-called natural, law is a mere empty shell, a com-
monplace generality, as long as it cannot be applied. 7 And as long as
it is not applied by natural lawmakers, there can be no natural law
at all.
Some primitive societies have indeed solved this problem by let-
ting not only the supreme law be made by "natural," i. e., divine,
authority but also applied by a class of priests whose quasi-divine
status is strictly maintained.3 In this case the problem of delegation
is solved: on every level of the legal hierarchy there is the natural
lawmaker who through his priest - to say it with Kelsen - makes
(natural) law by applying (natural) law. This means in the last ana-
lysis again that natural law is based on faith. If I do not chose to
believe in the divine character of either the supreme lawmaker or of
his priests, then to me the law thus made and applied is quite the
7 Gray's idea, however, that all law is judge-made law is equally fallacious as
Austin's definition of the law as the sovereign's command. As KELSEN, GENERAL
THiEORY oF LAw AND STATE, especially at 150-52 (1945), shows, law is both made
and applied on every step of the hierarchy.
8 Up to Tiberius Coruncanius (250 B.C.), the first plebian pontifex maximus,
Roman law (at least procedure) was a secret, sacred art, carefully guarded by
patrician priests. See Parker, The Criteria of the Civil Law, 7 THE JURIST 153 (1947).
Christianity has not chosen to endow its ministers with divine character. Conse-
quently, its precepts have been subjected to many conflicting interpretations
among the various sects.
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opposite of natural law. It is man-made. Thus even those primitive
societies cannot truly be said to live under natural law. All we can say
is that their inhabitants believe that their law is "natural."
Some writers on this point have tried to leave to natural law at
least the function of filling legal gaps. While the positive lawmaker
(Austin's "sovereign") makes the law, the judge through pure rea-
son, hence supposedly on a natural-law basis, fills the legis lacunae
which the lawmaker has left. This has been strongly argued re-
cently by Lord Wright.9 Ironically, however, he quotes for illustra-
tion the well-known Article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code, which confers
upon Swiss judges the right (or rather, the authority) to fill legal
gaps. In other words, Lord Wright adduces positive law as an argu-
ment in support of what is called a power deriving from natural lawl
It cannot really be doubted that the power of courts and other law-
making and applying agencies to amend law by fictitiously asserting
the existence of a gap is nothing but the application of a rather funda-
mental norm of the positive law, which may be paraphrased as
follows: A judge in applying existing law may in his discretion, when-
ever he finds the law unsatisfactory and contrary to what he believes
to be a principle of justice, alter the law by granting new causes of
action or new defenses, as the case may be. This authority derives from
the positive (customary) law as much as any other lawmaker's author-
ity, like that of Congress from the Constitution.10
Another argument perhaps more appealing to practical-minded
lawyers is the insoluble conflict of natural law with recognized posi-
tive law. Only one system can be valid, yet somehow they are asserted
to coexist with one another. Let us assume for a moment that natural
law proclaims that every man is born free and that consequently
slavery is not in harmony with natural law. As we know, despite
thousands of years of human slavery, there were certain natural
lawyers who did so hold. Very well, then - were the slavery laws of
Virginia, Great Britain, ancient Rome, Greece, or Babylonia non-
law? Can it be said that every transaction, decision, or regulation
made pursuant to those laws throughout the millenniums was null
and void as being in violation of The Law, the supreme, "natural"
law whence all other law must derive its validity? Very few natural
lawyers have ever seriously drawn this ultimate consequence from
their own theory."- Such a consequence would not have suited the
political purpose of most of its protagonists, who were conservatives
and whose ideas were propounded in support of throne and altar;
9 Wright, Natural Law and International Law in INTERPRETATIONS OF IODERN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 794 (Sayre ed. 1947).
10 Kelsen, supra note 7.
11 See Kelsen, The Natural Law Doctrine Before the Tribunal of Science, 2
WEsrERN POL. REV. 481, 485-94 (1949).
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but even the radical minority, who used natural law as an argument
in opposition of the existing order, indulging in slogans such as
Property Is Theft, have not usually dared to say more than that the
positive law is "bad" law rather than non-law, as it of course would
be if natural law were law.
I am of course aware that there may be an apparently supreme
norm or constitution that does not per se render norms contravening
it void or voidable. European constitutional provisions to that effect
are not infrequent. In abstract form, such a norm may be restated
as follows: This code or constitution shall be the supreme law of the
land; but any law contravening it (e. g., a statute duly enacted by the
diet and sanctioned by the crown) shall nevertheless be valid until
repealed by another statute. Such a clause obviously makes the consti-
tution illusory. Yet natural lawyers of all ages have resorted to the
same device. In other words, beside the immutable substantive precepts
of the natural law there is supposed to exist also an auxiliary norm
according to which law made by duly constituted authority that is
contrary to the natural law is valid nevertheless. As a matter of fact,
as Kelsen's survey shows, this "auxiliary" part of the natural law -
the precept that man must, in any event, obey authority, be it
good or bad' 2 - is the one that many a natural lawyer liked best.13
Be this as it may, its introduction immediately reduces natural law to
the legally superfluous command that law - any law - must be obey-
ed, coupled with the desire that law ought to be "good." But of course,
a desire is not law.
III. NOT A USEFUL LIE
Plato in his Laws thinks that a government must not avoid
telling lies to its citizens if they are useful. Thus it ought to tell the
people that only the just man can be happy; for if this is a lie, it is
a very useful one inasmuch as it stimulates obedience to the law. To
this Kelsen adds "that the Natural Law doctrine, as it pretends, is able
to determine in an objective manner what is just, is a lie; but those
who consider it useful may make use of it as of a useful lie."'14
Kelsen in his great objectivity calls the dispute over the natural
law a never-ending one.15 Yet he demonstrates clearly how the doc-
trine has been used - and misused - by virtually every political
theory and proposition in order to objectivize its claims. For man is
12 Id. at 491-92.
13 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part II/xxvi, proclaims that "obedience to the civil law
is part also of the law of nature."
14 Kelsen, supra, note 11, at 513.
15 KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 446 (1945.)
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very small. He does not care to say, I consider such and such a form
of government or system of private law a desirable one, hence I will
work toward its accomplishment by influencing my fellow men. He
prefers to say that his idea and his idea only is the good and ultimate
law which he, fortunately, was able to "find." And if he has power to
bind and solve, he still does often not care to say, such will be the
law from now on. Rather, he "finds" it by divine inspiration, by know-
ing the people's true will and wishes, or simply knowing what is best.
Thus natural law has been used as a device for rendering the law
absolute by lawmakers from Hammurabi, Moses, and Mohammed
down to the Fathers as well as Hitler, and by theorists of all kinds 1 6
It was used to uphold and to fight slavery, to show that human free-
dom can, but freedom of property cannot, be taken away by positive
law, that property is against nature, that obedience to the law is in
itself the supreme law, that tyrannical governments may be over-
thrown, that the oceans are free, that all navigable waters belong to
England, that all men are alike, that certain races or nations are in-
ferior to others, that there exists a natural Grossraumordnung for the
world, and so on usque ad infinitum.17
It can be said that in an autocracy or even a monarchy it may be
a useful thing to deify the power of the state. Indeed, the fact that a
certain, particular individual and no other is the monarch can be
conveniently rationalized by invoking divine law18 (pro tanto the same
as natural law), beyond which there is no question, no further auth-
ority. The political theory of a democracy, however, must of neces-
sity hold otherwise. Instead of pretending to set forth the ruler's idea
of justice as the only correct and hence as the absolutely valid one, the
democratic theory of state recognizes that in every society there are
interests whose conflicts can best be harmonized by letting those that
are subject to the law take part in its making. Democracy recognizes,
by its very definition, the rule of the majority rather than a preor-
dained rule or ruler. Democracy acknowledges the fact that no law
is perfect per se. Nor can we endeavor to have law that pleases every-
body. We can do only the second best - make law that pleases at
least the majority as constituted from time to time. Thus in a democ-
racy the invocation of natural law is indeed not a useful lie. It is the
very antithesis of democracy.
16 Apart from vague notions among some Greek philosophers, whose im-
portance is usually exaggerated, the first theoretical foundation was given the
natural law idea by Cicero, the statesman and politician, who used his legal train-
ing to promote his political views. Cf. Parker, Book Review, 60 HARv. L. Rv.
1371 (1947).
17 For instances in the lighter vein (e.g., a decision declaring prohibition to be
an attempt to rob man of his natural right to drink alcohol) see Paulsen,
"Natural Rights" -A Constitutional Doctrine in Indiana, 25 IND. L. J. 124 (1950).
18 " . . . King by the Grace of God... "
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